Sunday, April 19, 2015

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Mali: Heightened Risk of Kidnaps and Attacks in Bamako and Mining Areas

Prolonged control of areas of northern Mali and a shortage of kidnap targets in the north has led MUJWA to expand its operations to new areas.
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A cattle market on the outskirts of Bamako. Photograph by Romel Jacinto.

Lack of kidnap targets in the north and increased jihadist capabilities raise risks of kidnap and IED attacks in Bamako and mining areas

On November 20, six gunmen abducted a Portuguese-born Frenchman from the town of Diema in the western Kayes region, which borders Senegal and Mauritania. This indicates a southward geographical expansion of jihadist activity from bases in the northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The militant Islamist group, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), claimed responsibility for the kidnap. The hostage is currently being held near Timbuktu, about 700km from Diema.

The expansion of the group’s operations to new areas has been facilitated by their prolonged control of parts of northern Mali and motivated by a shortage of kidnap targets in the north. Further, ethnic Tuaregs, particularly, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), have opposed the Islamist groups and looked to retake territory. In mid-November, MNLA launched an unsuccessful offensive to recover the town of Menaka from MUJAO, close to the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger.

Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaore, who is leading ECOWAS' mediation efforts, is likely to propose an end to hostilities between the MNLA and Islamists Ansar Dine, much of whose leadership is Tuareg. On December 3, representatives from the Malian government travelled to Ouagadougou to engage in dialogue for the first time with the two groups. However, negotiations are unlikely to be successful without significant concessions by all sides.

Ansar Dine’s renouncement of relations with MUJAO and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and possible cooperation with MNLA would increase risks of kidnap and targeted attacks against mining assets in southern Mali, including Kayes, but would probably restrict MUJAO and AQIM access to Burkina Faso and Niger. The risk of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on commercial and diplomatic assets in Bamako would also increase. French assets are particularly likely to be targeted, given France's continuing support for the proposed ECOWAS military intervention.

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Not sure what to make of this analysis. It's not at all clear that Ansar Dine has renounced relations with AQIM, but either way, since MUJAO is in control of the parts of northern Mali that border Burkina Faso and Niger, I'm not sure how AD's possible cooperation with the MNLA restricts MUJAO/AQIM's access to those places.