Wednesday, May 22, 2013

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The poaching of rhinoceros in Africa is a growing problem. The increasingly prevalent photos of brutally-slain beasts in conservation reserves or African savannahs provide an insight into the cruelty of the trade, but dramatic numbers reveal its extent.

In South Africa, home to three quarters of Africa’s remaining rhinos, the number killed per year has increased from 13 in 2007, to 333 in 2010, to 668 in 2012. In Mozambique meanwhile, rhino numbers have plummeted from 300 in 2002 to zero as of this April when poachers killed the final 15.

These statistics drive home the fact that the killings are rarely isolated acts but rather part of an extensive global trade involving experienced criminal networks and inevitably some official complicity. Worryingly, this trade has not only been increasing in recent years, but it has been increasing despite concerted efforts from governments, NGOs, security forces and game rangers.

Amidst these failures, many are now calling for a new approach, with some even proposing the legalisation of the trade in rhino horn.

A tough-skinned problem

South Africa is home to around 90% of the world’s white rhinos and around 40% of the world’s black rhinos. This makes South Africa central in the fight against poaching, and to tackle the problem the government has supported conservation efforts and even involved the military and police. However, even South Africa – probably the best-equipped African country to deal with the issue – is struggling.

The main market for rhino horn is Asia – in particular Vietnam and China – where it is used in traditional medicines. Recently, demand has grown – particularly thanks to China’s growing middle classes – causing the black market value of horn to skyrocket; rhino horn currently stands at around $60,000 per kilogram – more than its weight in gold. Meanwhile, the poachers and the criminal gangs involved have become increasingly well-armed and complex – with some reports of armed insurgent groups also joining in and poaching as a source of income – especially in terms of duping customs officials and bribing their way out of Africa and into Asia.

Understandably, given the sophistication of these illicit activities, the introduction of the military into the fight has done little to stem the flow. And now, a different approach, previously advocated by some conservationists, is becoming more widely considered amongst senior decision-makers.

At the recent Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), South Africa pushed for the legalisation of the trade, its third attempt since 1994. "We believe it is the right direction”, Edna Molewa, South Africa’s Environmental Affairs Minister, said in an interview with the Mail & Guardian, adding “we need to address this issue of trade in a controlled manner so that we can at least begin to push down this pressure."

Charging ahead with legalisation?

According to Duan Biggs, a conservation expert and co-author of a study into the possible legalisation of rhino horn, the current ban “artificially restricts supply in the face of persistent and growing demand”. This, he says, drives prices higher, making the incentives to poach greater. Furthermore, any ban is very difficult to uphold given the ability of gangs to get past restrictions by bribing officials.

Instead of a ban, Biggs and his colleagues advocate the controlled harvesting of horn from rhino by sedating the animal and shaving off of portions of the horn. Given its keratin structure, the horn grows back. These shavings would be managed by a Central Selling Organization (CSO), which would regulate the harvesting of horn and manage its trade. This alternative model, according to Biggs, would be sustainable, drive down prices and undercut criminal gangs.

Not everyone is convinced, however. One major concern is that harvesting horn may not meet demand and that even if it could, the increased availability of rhino horn would increase demand, driving prices – and the interest of poachers – back up.

“Legal trade may stimulate more demand”, argues Lucy Boddham-Whetham, former Deputy Director of Save the Rhino. “There are only c. 28,000 rhino in the world and a potential market of 1.5 billion users in China, Vietnam and other East Asian countries.”

Biggs argues that current demand can be met by 5,000 of South Africa’s 20,000-strong rhino population, leaving room for expansion if necessary. This population would also increase once poaching was curbed. But there remain fears that Biggs has underestimated the potential for demand to increase once an expensive, illicit and already highly-treasured item becomes far more affordable, widely available and legal.

Another main concern is that the corruption which currently hinders the ban on the trade of rhino horn would also permeate any organisation monitoring its legal trade. Controls ensuring that any rhino horn being sold was legally farmed, for example, could presumably be undermined by the same forms of bribery operating today, allowing poached horn to enter the market as legal, farmed horn.

Again, Biggs thinks this problem can also be overcome. “The technology now exists to track the legality of individual horns through the selling chain to the end consumer to minimise laundering and the illegal trade”, he told Think Africa Press. But nevertheless, this question of enforceability remains a key argument against the legalisation of the rhino horn trade. Boddham-Whetham states that “since authorities cannot police the current ban, they would not be able to control a legal trade and prevent it”.

Additionally, still in the minds of some environmentalists is the failure of a similar initiative whereby ‘one-off’ trade of stockpiled ivory was legalised in a bid to meet demand and drive down prices. Some fear the unforeseen consequences of this scheme would undermine a full-scale legalisation. In the case of ivory stockpiles, many criminal gangs benefited as they were able to get their poached ivory fraudulently verified as ‘stockpile ivory’ through bribery, while demand for ivory is believed to have increased.

Flogging a dead rhino

If enough consensus were to be found to legalise the trade in rhino horn, there would clearly be a number of complex problems that need to be overcome. But with the current battle for the survival of the rhinoceros in Africa being lost, many still believe the point has been reached where new strategies must be considered.

"The reality”, said Edna Molewa, “is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing every day isn't working”.

Indeed, as numbers continue to dwindle despite bolstered security programmes, it may simply be too costly not to try something new. But whether that something ought to be legalisation remains highly contentious.

Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com

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As the African Union (AU) prepares to celebrate its 50th Anniversary at a time when consultations on what will replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the post-2015 agenda are gathering pace, leaders and civil society alike are debating and determining future priorities that will shape the next decade of development and beyond.

When children under the age of 18 make up as much as 60% of the population in some African countries, isn’t it imperative they take centre stage in the new development agenda? When such a large and crucial constituency continues to face immense challenges in terms of neglect and exclusion, lack of access to quality basic social services such as health and education, who continue to face violence and abuse, how can we ensure that there is accelerated action and attention given to them?

It is these critical issues that a group of eminent African leaders, experts and thinkers intend to focus on when we meet for a High Level Dialogue on 21 May in Addis Ababa with a simple goal – to ensure the rights and needs of children are front and centre of the post-2015 development agenda.

The MDGs have achieved much for children, galvanizing development efforts and guiding global and national priorities. And since their introduction in 2000, Africa has witnessed much progress - from some impressive reductions in child mortality, to greatly improved primary school enrolment. But there remains an urgent and unfinished agenda for Africa’s children. As long as the number of preventable deaths remain unacceptably high; as long as some 40% of children suffer chronic malnutrition; as long as children are excluded from secondary education, especially girls; as long as a rapidly growing young population lack skills development and employment opportunities; as long as children continue to face daily violence, abuse and exploitation in the home, at school, in their communities and across borders - this is an agenda that requires specific, targeted and comprehensive commitments going forward to not only build on the past progress that has been made but accelerate action.

On the eve of the AU celebrating its 50th anniversary, and as Heads of State prepare to agree Africa’s Common Position on the post-2015 agenda, as a continent we can look back proudly on its past stewardship. But it must also seize the chance – indeed the imperative – to use this moment to show extraordinary foresight, leadership, vision and commitment to ensure children are front and centre in the post-2015 agenda. It must be an agenda that tackles children’s realities and their potential. So for the sake of development – human, social and economic – it is time to put children and their best interests at the centre of development, nowhere more so than in Africa.

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On 5 May, an improvised hand grenade was thrown into the grounds of St Joseph's Church in Arusha's Olasiti suburb, killing 3 people and wounding 63 others. The attack was targeted at a large celebration attended by the Vatican Nuncio, a diplomatic representative of the Holy See. Following sectarian unrest in Mbeya, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Mwanza earlier this year, armed security at Christian sites was stepped up, especially during the lead-up to Easter celebrations.

While the Tanzanian government initially arrested several Saudi and UAE nationals (since released without charge) in connection with the bombing, the attack was most likely perpetrated by a domestic group seeking to provoke further sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims. The improvised explosive device (IED) appears to have been competently assembled with the aim of causing maximum casualties through the use of shrapnel. Details available on the IED's construction do not, however, necessarily indicate external assistance.

Regional groups – such as Somalia’s al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) – have little attack capability in Tanzania and any attacks would more likely target security forces and Western interests rather than be aimed at provoking sectarian violence. Therefore this attack was most likely staged by a domestic group, probably Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam (Community of Muslim Organisations). This radical Islamist organisation is headed by Sheikh Issa Ponda, who has close ties to Zanzibari Islamist groups which have sought to provoke sectarian unrest and were behind the rioting in Dar es Salaam in 1998 and October 2012.

In the likely event of future attacks on Christians, violent confrontations are likely in cities with mixed populations, such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Arusha and Zanzibar's Stone Town. Such violence is likely to take the form of targeted killings, arson attacks and riots.

The nature of the IED used in Arusha does not alter the assessment that emerging militant groups currently lack the capability to inflict major damage on commercial or Western targets. However, the risk of attack on Western hotels, critical infrastructure and strategic sectors such as natural gas and mining, is likely to increase over the next two years or so, especially if domestic groups secure funding and technical support from groups such as AQEA and al-Shabaab.

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The Salafist Muslim grouping, Ansar al-Sharia, is scheduled to hold a large gathering in the city of Kairouan, located in Tunisia's Kairouan governorate, on 19 May. The meeting will be held at the al-Okba Mosque.

A spokesperson for Ansar al-Sharia has stated that they expect up to 40,000 people to attend the event. Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisia’s ruling party, Al-Nahda, issued a statement on 15 May stating that the government will prohibit the Salafist meeting as the event organisers had not obtained the requisite permission to gather.

The planned gathering comes amid escalating tensions between the government and Salafists in Tunisia in recent months. The tensions are a result of a change in position by al-Nahda, the ruling moderate Islamist party, regarding Salafists, specifically Ansar al-Sharia.

Following the 2011 Tunisian revolution, Salafist groups emerged and began agitating for a greater implementation of Sharia law in the country, specifically in the constitution, which is due to be finalised later in 2013. Since 2011, Salafists have been linked to numerous acts of public violence against persons, events and businesses deemed un-Islamic. Ansar al-Sharia in particular has been accused of various violent acts, including unrest outside of the US Embassy in the capital, Tunis, in September 2012, which left four people dead.

In 2012, al-Nahda continued to call for dialogue and rapprochement with Salafists, opening it up to severe criticism from political opponents, which accused the government of giving Salafists too much leeway. But in light of the US embassy incident, numerous clashes between Salafists and security force personnel, the assassination of a prominent leftist leader, Chokri Belaid, in February (linked to radical Islamists), and rising anger at perceived al-Nahda inaction, the ruling party has shifted its position.

In recent days, police have thwarted a number of planned Salafists gatherings, including in Tunis on 11 May. The government has also launched a military sweep of its border regions with Algeria in recent weeks in an attempt to locate and eliminate suspected Islamist militants operating in the area. Ansar al-Sharia, specifically its leader Abu Iyadh (also known as Seif Allah Hassine), has denounced the government's new policy and has threatened to conduct war against the regime if the clampdowns do not cease. These threats are likely to embolden the government; further confrontations between security personnel and Salafist groupings should be anticipated.

The Kairouan gathering remains a potential flash point in the near-term. Despite Ansar al-Sharia not receiving permission to gather, it is likely that the gathering will proceed. The authorities are expected to increase security in and around the city in the lead up to the event and, given recent precedent, will likely act to prevent any large gathering.

By Andre Colling, Chief Analyst, Middle East and North Africa, for red24.

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The ‘Afropolitan’ jet-setters began the year in a swirl of curious and adoring headlines, their multinational lives embodied in the figure of author Taiye Selasi. Having coined the term – combining ‘African’ and ‘cosmopolitan – in a 2005 essay, Selasi captured the identity and roots of the Afropolitan in her smash debut novel Ghana Must Go, which was received with amphitheatre fanfare just a few months ago.

Afropolitans are the young and restless who have fled Africa since the 1960s in search of work and education. They overcame immigrant crash-landings fraught with prejudice and poverty. They sprouted into authors, musicians, DJs, doctors, lawyers, professors and athletes. When asked “where are you from?”, the Afropolitan smiles and shrugs, too international for quaint ideas of origin and identity.

Now, Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie adds to the concept with her third novel, Americanah, which begins and ends as a love story, but spends hundreds of mid-zone pages hacking away at the term’s glamorous gloss. For Adichie’s characters, the Afropolitan experience is not just a story of triumph – and often not at all – but rather an endless subplot of extreme inter- and intra-racial tensions rooted most deeply in the Western cultural epicentre of the United States of America.

Intercontinental love song

When we meet Ifemelu, her class conflict in America is behind her, and, despite her success, she’s preparing for a move back to Nigeria; issues of race, identity and belonging still loom impossibly large. She’s on her way into a hair salon to get what turn out to be some very metaphoric braids, and gradually readers are introduced to the terms of her migration from Nigeria, the humiliating saga of her initial economic survival in America, and the phoenix-like revival of her personality as a caustic and insightful blogger and public speaker.

On the other end of the love affair is Obinze, who, despite his mother’s Anglophilia, grows up with a smouldering interest in America, especially its literature. We first meet him in Nigeria, full-grown as one of the country’s Big Men. But despite his riches, Obinze feels forlorn and unfulfilled, his heart pining for Ifemelu, his adolescent sweetheart. He was supposed to follow her to America after his schooling, but Obinze couldn’t wrangle a visa because of the country’s post-9/11 fear of young, unemployed men with dark complexions. Instead, he goes to England, struggles to eke out a working life under an illegal name, and is ultimately booted out in handcuffs.

By then, his bond with Ifemelu has been severed. Stinging from an episode of sexual exploitation, Ifemelu walled Obinze out while he was still in Nigeria. They embarked on separate romantic journeys, only rediscovering each other when Ifemelu returns to Lagos and brings the plot full circle. Americanah is at its dullest when preoccupied with the yearning between these two, and Adichie relies too often on whole bricks of expository prose and almost mawkish character dynamics to drive her cast to romantic resolution.

Race rage

The middle section of the novel seems imported from another project. Here, we have a livid, often frustrating, and relentlessly compelling examination of racism and prejudice, one that overturns the cheerier message of Afropolitan integration installed in Selasi’s essay and novel.

Ifemelu is the vehicle for much of these revelations. In America, she perceives an almost infinite multitude of tensions and subcategories. Whites – be they rich, poor, or ethnic – swing from the summit of the race ladder. The darkest of the blacks suffer and perish way down at the bottom. The black-skinned world is mottled with distinctions and fault lines, much of those caught up in an individual’s historical distance from Africa. Relationships are thickened by a mess of indicators: accents, education, music, diction, art, diet, first languages, religion, politics, class, fashion. It’s endless. Meanwhile, America works to neutralise the hallmarks of Ifemelu’s identity – her accent, her hair, her taste – allegedly because it can’t tolerate her pronounced Africana.

In England, Obinze experiences a similar racism, though slightly less supercharged; he’s black, and so treated as simply a lesser person. Relationships he had with family and friends in Nigeria are subverted in England, the class and power structures reversed by Obinze’s inability to legitimise his presence in the country by marrying one of its nationals. At the best of times, the majority is cold and indifferent. At the worst of times, it’s predatory. All the while, Africans dig in against other Africans.

Americanah’s meta-defences

Americanah pre-empts criticism against its most obvious faults. Readers bored with the overbearing romantic themes of its opening and closing acts are reminded by certain characters that their tastes have probably been corrupted by the preponderance of the modern American novel, with its supposedly vapid addiction to irony and aesthetic. Don’t care for the sometimes clumsy paragraphs linking the hearts of Ifemelu and Obinze? Then perhaps you’ve read too much David Foster Wallace.

Likewise, white readers who wonder if the Western world really is so ubiquitously racist, racial, and race-obsessed are told by Ifemelu that in fact they wouldn’t know. White people in America simply aren’t reminded of their race, because it’s never used against them. And if young white people remember the persecution of, say, their Irish or Italian grandparents, then they need to also remember that those ancestors had it much better than did the descendants of African slaves.

“You can’t write an honest novel about race in this country”, contends one character. “If you write about how people are really affected by race, it’ll be too obvious.”

Unfortunately, there are no redeeming white characters in the novel, and very few black ones who undergo Americanisation and come back uncorrupted. Adichie does illustrate a few whites who come close to decency, but ultimately their characters are lowered by the inherently clumsy or subtly entitled ways they relate to blacks.

On the face of things, that’s perfectly fine. Readers, and not authors, are at fault when they consume individual works of art in search of real-life representations. Characters are imagined to drive story, not appease politics – and anyway fiction isn’t journalism. Adichie’s reductionist characterisations tilt parts of her story into satire, and they’re often done with compelling strokes of humour and absurdity – except that Adichie herself looms over those reductions.

Through lectures, essays and themes in her fiction, she’s politicised herself, and by extension her work. Along with authors such as Binyavanga Wainaina – who, because of his caretaking of Americanah’s early drafts, she thanks in her acknowledgements – Adichie has emerged as something of a narrative nationalist. Her career is increasingly bound up with ideas of ideologically accurate and holistic representations of Africa and Africans. It therefore smacks a little bit of hypocrisy to read constantly of white Westerners who are, without much variation, venal, perverted, arrogant, intolerant, self-obsessed, or ridden with white-liberal-middle-class guilt complexes.

Keep it in the ethnicity?

Numerous times in Americanah, Ifemelu contends that racism doesn’t exist in Nigeria. This is a bit hard to swallow. Racism, at its heart, is discrimination based on difference – real or perceived – and there’s more than enough of that in Nigeria or anywhere else people exist in even moderate diversity. Adichie circumvents Ifemelu’s idealism with the occasional nod to ethnic tensions in Nigeria, in particular a conversation between two characters that interprets the Biafran War. The point may be that in Nigeria, Ifemelu wouldn’t notice racism as she’s majority-coloured.

Either way, for America’s racist conceits, Infemelu prescribes the cure of love, writing in her blog that it’s the only force strong enough to subdue the ubiquity of racial prejudice. But she herself cannot find love with Americans, white or black, and ultimately finds her heart’s requital with Obinze. Both are Nigerian and both are Igbo.

At the end of Ghana Must Go, Selasi riffs on a similar theme, but wraps it up with more auspicious results. One of her main characters – a black African living in America – is able to overcome romantic strife and emotionally double-down with his partner, an Asian woman also living in America. It’s an optimistic pronouncement on the future of Afropolitinism because it imagines a continued and farther reaching arch of multi-racial harmony. Imagine now Afropolitans reconnecting and becoming little more than a subtle distinction of cosmopolitans. Tensions over difference melt away as people are increasingly indistinguishable according to race and origin.

But Adichie – named specifically in Selasi’s essay as an Afropolitan writer – closes her novel with considerably more cynicism. The Afropolitian experiment is over, her characters seem to say, and now it’s time to go back home.

Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com

For further reading around the subject see:

 

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