On the outskirts of Ubari, a remote outpost in Libya’s southwest near the Algerian border, armed militia from the Tebu tribe speed across the desert in Toyota trucks towards the sprawling Sharara oil fields.
They, along fighters from the town of Zintan further north, are spearheading efforts – under the auspices of Libya’s defence ministry – to secure the oil installation’s vast perimeter from sabotage. They want to protect against attacks such as those last January at the In Amenas gas complex, just kilometres across the border in Algeria, in which militant Islamists conducted a deadly assault, purportedly as a protest against the French-armed intervention in Mali.
Some are concerned Libya’s oil compounds could face a similar fate, but Ibrahim Essa, a Tebu leader of Sharara’s security force, says that although some Tuareg who disappeared to Mali with heavy weapons are back, they don’t pose as much of a threat since revolutionary forces now control the desert.
“Western countries think al-Qaeda is in Libya, but there are only a few”, he says. “We know very well Islamic extremists won’t fight us here.”
A drive across the width of southern Libya is gruelling. With no roads, the Tebu who inhabit this inhospitable terrain navigate gigantic sand dunes, sharp volcanic rocks and aging mine fields marked by empty gas canisters and makeshift stone piles, with the stars to guide their way.
Travelling the wide expanse are border guards, visiting relatives, and groups smuggling gasoline and people in Toyota four wheel-drive trucks. People seem to know each other in the sparsely populated land – or of each other – and follow desert etiquette in helping each other out.
Since the start of the conflict in northern Mali, security fears in these areas have heightened, especially after attacks such as last month’s bombing of the French embassy in downtown Tripoli.
In particular, control over Libya’s long and porous desert frontier with neighbouring Egypt, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia has been a major Libyan and international security concern since Muammar Gaddafi’s regime was toppled in 2011.
“There are a lot of weapons in Libya, and its geographical location makes it useful for linking countries up”, a Western diplomat told Think Africa Press on condition of anonymity. “Control of the borders means the ability to move people and weapons, so they are a big prize because they are quite strategic.”
Indeed, Libya’s borders are a crossing point for both large commercial and subsistence smugglers ferrying subsidised gasoline, migrants, weapons and drugs. Libya’s underground terrain is also rich in oil, rare minerals and the water that feeds the thirst of the majority of the population in cities along the coast.
Last December, Libya’s parliament tried to tackle the lawlessness of the region by temporarily closing the country’s southern borders and ruling that the southern areas – west from Ghadames, Ghat, Ubari, Sebha, Murzuq, and across 1,000 km off-road east to Kufra – would be "considered as closed military zones to be ruled under emergency law".
But in reality, the weak, under-resourced Tripoli government has little presence or power in the desert to implement the unclear mandate within this sweeping decree.
Instead, loose-knit militias form the backbone of the area’s border control, under the controversial government-sanctioned auxiliary forces, the defence ministry’s Libya Shield brigades, and the interior ministry’s Supreme Security Committee (SSC).
The indigenous Tebu tribe – a semi-nomadic group with ties across southern Libya and into Sudan, Niger and Chad – played a significant role in the revolt against the former regime and view themselves as natural guardians of Libya’s southern border.
The Tuareg – also native to the area, but on the losing side of Gaddafi’s war – share cross-border relations with Niger, Mali and Algeria, and unofficially control territory along Libya’s western flank.
These two groups share a history of discrimination in Libya under Gaddafi. The dictator’s ‘Arabisation’ campaign attempted to erase indigenous culture and language, and branded those not registered under the 1954 citizenship law as ‘foreigners’. Consequently the Tebu and Tuareg were deprived of healthcare and education, as well as skilled jobs and government positions.
At the onset of the 2011 uprising, Gaddafi promised them rights if they joined his fighting forces. The Tuareg threw their support behind the regime, while the Tebu took Gaddafi’s weapons and then turned them against him.
But now, despite having fought on opposing sides of the revolution, Libyan Tebu and Tuareg communities coexist in relative peace. They do not want to fight each other, but instead showcase their desert expertise in the struggle for a place at the new Libyan table.
But the same is not necessarily true of relations with other groups. In the power vacuum following Gaddafi’s demise, there have been bloody clashes in Sebha and Kufra between the Tebu and local Arab tribes, mostly over the lucrative business of cross-border smuggling.
The elders of the fighting Tebu and Awlad Suleiman tribe in Sebha have recently engineered a reconciliation agreement. But in the remote oasis of Kufra – surrounded by a gigantic wall and deeply segregated between an embittered Zwai and minority Tebu population – the small town is dangerously on edge.
Each tribe runs its own militias, most of which are embedded in government auxiliary forces. “At the moment there are a number of different groups on the ground”, says the Western diplomat. “But there needs to be clear official endorsement, and the weaving together of a unified national force to provide border security.”
Since NATO’s intervention in Libya’s uprising, invested countries like the UK, France, Italy and the US have rushed to provide advisors and, unofficially, clinch arms deals with the new Libyan government’s military and policing apparatus.
In neighbouring Niger, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has just established a military base for Predator drone surveillance, and the controversial US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is working with the Pentagon and CIA on a ‘kill or capture’ list for Libya.
American arms manufacturers and security companies are eager to gain a foothold, but have to navigate a knot of US regulations – leftover from the Gaddafi era – for licences to do business, which is currently a deterrent.
In April, the UK moored a Navy ship in Tripoli’s harbour to showcase the latest in their security equipment and services, and Prime Minister David Cameron personally visited Libya to sell British weapons systems. France and Italy are also competing to sell arms.
The European Union meanwhile, which has just arrived to spearhead an advisory border guard, is regarded as late on the scene, and potentially hamstrung by security considerations.
But amidst all this Western interest, Libya’s central government remains in chaos, in a country already awash with weapons.
Officially-sanctioned militias finally lifted a siege of ministries after the ‘Isolation law’ – which is widely interpreted as expelling or barring anyone from office who has been affiliated with the previous regime’s four-decade rule – was pushed through. But the defence and interior ministries remain in turmoil, and there is confusion over who holds the valuable border portfolio – the Army’s southern command, or the defence ministry’s border control commander.
With so much strategic planning and lucrative deals on the line, foreign embassies and businesses face the vital question of who exactly to conduct business with.
Meanwhile, Libyan citizens are left in highly uncertain circumstances.
“This revolution is only two years old”, says Baraka Adam, a Tebu chief, back in Ubari.
“When Gaddafi came to power for the first three years he was a good man. And then he changed. It’s too early to tell the future. But I am not 100% confident to predict that it will be better than before.”
Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com
For further reading around the subject see:
| Political Islam in Post-Gaddafi Libya | Review – Sandstorm: Libya in the Time of Revolution | Sarkozy and Libya: A Friendship in Trouble? |
The poaching of rhinoceros in Africa is a growing problem. The increasingly prevalent photos of brutally-slain beasts in conservation reserves or African savannahs provide an insight into the cruelty of the trade, but dramatic numbers reveal its extent.
In South Africa, home to three quarters of Africa’s remaining rhinos, the number killed per year has increased from 13 in 2007, to 333 in 2010, to 668 in 2012. In Mozambique meanwhile, rhino numbers have plummeted from 300 in 2002 to zero as of this April when poachers killed the final 15.
These statistics drive home the fact that the killings are rarely isolated acts but rather part of an extensive global trade involving experienced criminal networks and inevitably some official complicity. Worryingly, this trade has not only been increasing in recent years, but it has been increasing despite concerted efforts from governments, NGOs, security forces and game rangers.
Amidst these failures, many are now calling for a new approach, with some even proposing the legalisation of the trade in rhino horn.
South Africa is home to around 90% of the world’s white rhinos and around 40% of the world’s black rhinos. This makes South Africa central in the fight against poaching, and to tackle the problem the government has supported conservation efforts and even involved the military and police. However, even South Africa – probably the best-equipped African country to deal with the issue – is struggling.
The main market for rhino horn is Asia – in particular Vietnam and China – where it is used in traditional medicines. Recently, demand has grown – particularly thanks to China’s growing middle classes – causing the black market value of horn to skyrocket; rhino horn currently stands at around $60,000 per kilogram – more than its weight in gold. Meanwhile, the poachers and the criminal gangs involved have become increasingly well-armed and complex – with some reports of armed insurgent groups also joining in and poaching as a source of income – especially in terms of duping customs officials and bribing their way out of Africa and into Asia.
Understandably, given the sophistication of these illicit activities, the introduction of the military into the fight has done little to stem the flow. And now, a different approach, previously advocated by some conservationists, is becoming more widely considered amongst senior decision-makers.
At the recent Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), South Africa pushed for the legalisation of the trade, its third attempt since 1994. "We believe it is the right direction”, Edna Molewa, South Africa’s Environmental Affairs Minister, said in an interview with the Mail & Guardian, adding “we need to address this issue of trade in a controlled manner so that we can at least begin to push down this pressure."
According to Duan Biggs, a conservation expert and co-author of a study into the possible legalisation of rhino horn, the current ban “artificially restricts supply in the face of persistent and growing demand”. This, he says, drives prices higher, making the incentives to poach greater. Furthermore, any ban is very difficult to uphold given the ability of gangs to get past restrictions by bribing officials.
Instead of a ban, Biggs and his colleagues advocate the controlled harvesting of horn from rhino by sedating the animal and shaving off of portions of the horn. Given its keratin structure, the horn grows back. These shavings would be managed by a Central Selling Organization (CSO), which would regulate the harvesting of horn and manage its trade. This alternative model, according to Biggs, would be sustainable, drive down prices and undercut criminal gangs.
Not everyone is convinced, however. One major concern is that harvesting horn may not meet demand and that even if it could, the increased availability of rhino horn would increase demand, driving prices – and the interest of poachers – back up.
“Legal trade may stimulate more demand”, argues Lucy Boddham-Whetham, former Deputy Director of Save the Rhino. “There are only c. 28,000 rhino in the world and a potential market of 1.5 billion users in China, Vietnam and other East Asian countries.”
Biggs argues that current demand can be met by 5,000 of South Africa’s 20,000-strong rhino population, leaving room for expansion if necessary. This population would also increase once poaching was curbed. But there remain fears that Biggs has underestimated the potential for demand to increase once an expensive, illicit and already highly-treasured item becomes far more affordable, widely available and legal.
Another main concern is that the corruption which currently hinders the ban on the trade of rhino horn would also permeate any organisation monitoring its legal trade. Controls ensuring that any rhino horn being sold was legally farmed, for example, could presumably be undermined by the same forms of bribery operating today, allowing poached horn to enter the market as legal, farmed horn.
Again, Biggs thinks this problem can also be overcome. “The technology now exists to track the legality of individual horns through the selling chain to the end consumer to minimise laundering and the illegal trade”, he told Think Africa Press. But nevertheless, this question of enforceability remains a key argument against the legalisation of the rhino horn trade. Boddham-Whetham states that “since authorities cannot police the current ban, they would not be able to control a legal trade and prevent it”.
Additionally, still in the minds of some environmentalists is the failure of a similar initiative whereby ‘one-off’ trade of stockpiled ivory was legalised in a bid to meet demand and drive down prices. Some fear the unforeseen consequences of this scheme would undermine a full-scale legalisation. In the case of ivory stockpiles, many criminal gangs benefited as they were able to get their poached ivory fraudulently verified as ‘stockpile ivory’ through bribery, while demand for ivory is believed to have increased.
If enough consensus were to be found to legalise the trade in rhino horn, there would clearly be a number of complex problems that need to be overcome. But with the current battle for the survival of the rhinoceros in Africa being lost, many still believe the point has been reached where new strategies must be considered.
"The reality”, said Edna Molewa, “is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing every day isn't working”.
Indeed, as numbers continue to dwindle despite bolstered security programmes, it may simply be too costly not to try something new. But whether that something ought to be legalisation remains highly contentious.
Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com
For further reading around the subject see:
| Monkey Business: The Rise of Bushmeat | Conserving Kenya's Pride | " China's Passive Role in "Tusk Diplomacy" |
Rebecca Murray is a freelance journalist who has reported extensively throughout the Middle East for publications including Al Jazeera English and Inter Press Service news agency. Murray was based in Libya throughout 2012, where she mostly wrote about the tribes along the border. She is a contributing author to a book about the Libyan revolution, to be published by Oxford University Press later this year.
As the African Union (AU) prepares to celebrate its 50th Anniversary at a time when consultations on what will replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the post-2015 agenda are gathering pace, leaders and civil society alike are debating and determining future priorities that will shape the next decade of development and beyond.
When children under the age of 18 make up as much as 60% of the population in some African countries, isn’t it imperative they take centre stage in the new development agenda? When such a large and crucial constituency continues to face immense challenges in terms of neglect and exclusion, lack of access to quality basic social services such as health and education, who continue to face violence and abuse, how can we ensure that there is accelerated action and attention given to them?
It is these critical issues that a group of eminent African leaders, experts and thinkers intend to focus on when we meet for a High Level Dialogue on 21 May in Addis Ababa with a simple goal – to ensure the rights and needs of children are front and centre of the post-2015 development agenda.
The MDGs have achieved much for children, galvanizing development efforts and guiding global and national priorities. And since their introduction in 2000, Africa has witnessed much progress - from some impressive reductions in child mortality, to greatly improved primary school enrolment. But there remains an urgent and unfinished agenda for Africa’s children. As long as the number of preventable deaths remain unacceptably high; as long as some 40% of children suffer chronic malnutrition; as long as children are excluded from secondary education, especially girls; as long as a rapidly growing young population lack skills development and employment opportunities; as long as children continue to face daily violence, abuse and exploitation in the home, at school, in their communities and across borders - this is an agenda that requires specific, targeted and comprehensive commitments going forward to not only build on the past progress that has been made but accelerate action.
On the eve of the AU celebrating its 50th anniversary, and as Heads of State prepare to agree Africa’s Common Position on the post-2015 agenda, as a continent we can look back proudly on its past stewardship. But it must also seize the chance – indeed the imperative – to use this moment to show extraordinary foresight, leadership, vision and commitment to ensure children are front and centre in the post-2015 agenda. It must be an agenda that tackles children’s realities and their potential. So for the sake of development – human, social and economic – it is time to put children and their best interests at the centre of development, nowhere more so than in Africa.
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For further reading around the subject see:
| Post-MDGs: It's Time to Listen to the People | Africa is Rising! At Least Its 1% Is | Africa's Two-Speed Education and Classrooms without Walls |
Joaquim is the Chairperson of the International Board of Trustees of The African Child Policy Forum (ACPF), having served since June 8, 2012.
He has long been at the forefront of Mozambican political life. He was Prime Minister of the transitional government that led up to independence in 1975, and thereafter was Minister for Foreign Affairs under independent Mozambique's First President, Samora Machel. He served as second President of Mozambique from 1986 to 2005, and devoted himself to restoring peace and stability in his country.
Since stepping down as President, he has become an elder statesman and is called upon by international bodies, such as the United Nations, to be an envoy or negotiator. He currently chairs the Joaquim Chissano Foundation and the Forum for Former African Heads of State and Government.
In 2007, he was awarded the inaugural Prize for Achievement in African Leadership by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.
Alex Upton is an editorial intern at Think Africa Press. He graduated from the University of Sussex with an MA in International Security. His interests inlude African security and politics, global health security and conservation. He can be contacted at a.upton56@gmail.com
On 5 May, an improvised hand grenade was thrown into the grounds of St Joseph's Church in Arusha's Olasiti suburb, killing 3 people and wounding 63 others. The attack was targeted at a large celebration attended by the Vatican Nuncio, a diplomatic representative of the Holy See. Following sectarian unrest in Mbeya, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Mwanza earlier this year, armed security at Christian sites was stepped up, especially during the lead-up to Easter celebrations.
While the Tanzanian government initially arrested several Saudi and UAE nationals (since released without charge) in connection with the bombing, the attack was most likely perpetrated by a domestic group seeking to provoke further sectarian violence between Christians and Muslims. The improvised explosive device (IED) appears to have been competently assembled with the aim of causing maximum casualties through the use of shrapnel. Details available on the IED's construction do not, however, necessarily indicate external assistance.
Regional groups – such as Somalia’s al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) – have little attack capability in Tanzania and any attacks would more likely target security forces and Western interests rather than be aimed at provoking sectarian violence. Therefore this attack was most likely staged by a domestic group, probably Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam (Community of Muslim Organisations). This radical Islamist organisation is headed by Sheikh Issa Ponda, who has close ties to Zanzibari Islamist groups which have sought to provoke sectarian unrest and were behind the rioting in Dar es Salaam in 1998 and October 2012.
In the likely event of future attacks on Christians, violent confrontations are likely in cities with mixed populations, such as Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Arusha and Zanzibar's Stone Town. Such violence is likely to take the form of targeted killings, arson attacks and riots.
The nature of the IED used in Arusha does not alter the assessment that emerging militant groups currently lack the capability to inflict major damage on commercial or Western targets. However, the risk of attack on Western hotels, critical infrastructure and strategic sectors such as natural gas and mining, is likely to increase over the next two years or so, especially if domestic groups secure funding and technical support from groups such as AQEA and al-Shabaab.
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For further reading around the subject see:
| Zanzibar and the Mainland: The Shaky State of the Union | Singing, Spirituality and Islam: If Music be the Food of Love | The United Republic of Tanzania? |
The Salafist Muslim grouping, Ansar al-Sharia, is scheduled to hold a large gathering in the city of Kairouan, located in Tunisia's Kairouan governorate, on 19 May. The meeting will be held at the al-Okba Mosque.
A spokesperson for Ansar al-Sharia has stated that they expect up to 40,000 people to attend the event. Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisia’s ruling party, Al-Nahda, issued a statement on 15 May stating that the government will prohibit the Salafist meeting as the event organisers had not obtained the requisite permission to gather.
The planned gathering comes amid escalating tensions between the government and Salafists in Tunisia in recent months. The tensions are a result of a change in position by al-Nahda, the ruling moderate Islamist party, regarding Salafists, specifically Ansar al-Sharia.
Following the 2011 Tunisian revolution, Salafist groups emerged and began agitating for a greater implementation of Sharia law in the country, specifically in the constitution, which is due to be finalised later in 2013. Since 2011, Salafists have been linked to numerous acts of public violence against persons, events and businesses deemed un-Islamic. Ansar al-Sharia in particular has been accused of various violent acts, including unrest outside of the US Embassy in the capital, Tunis, in September 2012, which left four people dead.
In 2012, al-Nahda continued to call for dialogue and rapprochement with Salafists, opening it up to severe criticism from political opponents, which accused the government of giving Salafists too much leeway. But in light of the US embassy incident, numerous clashes between Salafists and security force personnel, the assassination of a prominent leftist leader, Chokri Belaid, in February (linked to radical Islamists), and rising anger at perceived al-Nahda inaction, the ruling party has shifted its position.
In recent days, police have thwarted a number of planned Salafists gatherings, including in Tunis on 11 May. The government has also launched a military sweep of its border regions with Algeria in recent weeks in an attempt to locate and eliminate suspected Islamist militants operating in the area. Ansar al-Sharia, specifically its leader Abu Iyadh (also known as Seif Allah Hassine), has denounced the government's new policy and has threatened to conduct war against the regime if the clampdowns do not cease. These threats are likely to embolden the government; further confrontations between security personnel and Salafist groupings should be anticipated.
The Kairouan gathering remains a potential flash point in the near-term. Despite Ansar al-Sharia not receiving permission to gather, it is likely that the gathering will proceed. The authorities are expected to increase security in and around the city in the lead up to the event and, given recent precedent, will likely act to prevent any large gathering.
By Andre Colling, Chief Analyst, Middle East and North Africa, for red24.
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For further reading around the subject see:
| The Harlem Shake Tunisia-Style: Rocking the Body Politic | Experts Weekly: What Next for Tunisia? | Tunisia's Dangerous Identity Politics |
The ‘Afropolitan’ jet-setters began the year in a swirl of curious and adoring headlines, their multinational lives embodied in the figure of author Taiye Selasi. Having coined the term – combining ‘African’ and ‘cosmopolitan – in a 2005 essay, Selasi captured the identity and roots of the Afropolitan in her smash debut novel Ghana Must Go, which was received with amphitheatre fanfare just a few months ago.
Afropolitans are the young and restless who have fled Africa since the 1960s in search of work and education. They overcame immigrant crash-landings fraught with prejudice and poverty. They sprouted into authors, musicians, DJs, doctors, lawyers, professors and athletes. When asked “where are you from?”, the Afropolitan smiles and shrugs, too international for quaint ideas of origin and identity.
Now, Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie adds to the concept with her third novel, Americanah, which begins and ends as a love story, but spends hundreds of mid-zone pages hacking away at the term’s glamorous gloss. For Adichie’s characters, the Afropolitan experience is not just a story of triumph – and often not at all – but rather an endless subplot of extreme inter- and intra-racial tensions rooted most deeply in the Western cultural epicentre of the United States of America.
When we meet Ifemelu, her class conflict in America is behind her, and, despite her success, she’s preparing for a move back to Nigeria; issues of race, identity and belonging still loom impossibly large. She’s on her way into a hair salon to get what turn out to be some very metaphoric braids, and gradually readers are introduced to the terms of her migration from Nigeria, the humiliating saga of her initial economic survival in America, and the phoenix-like revival of her personality as a caustic and insightful blogger and public speaker.
On the other end of the love affair is Obinze, who, despite his mother’s Anglophilia, grows up with a smouldering interest in America, especially its literature. We first meet him in Nigeria, full-grown as one of the country’s Big Men. But despite his riches, Obinze feels forlorn and unfulfilled, his heart pining for Ifemelu, his adolescent sweetheart. He was supposed to follow her to America after his schooling, but Obinze couldn’t wrangle a visa because of the country’s post-9/11 fear of young, unemployed men with dark complexions. Instead, he goes to England, struggles to eke out a working life under an illegal name, and is ultimately booted out in handcuffs.
By then, his bond with Ifemelu has been severed. Stinging from an episode of sexual exploitation, Ifemelu walled Obinze out while he was still in Nigeria. They embarked on separate romantic journeys, only rediscovering each other when Ifemelu returns to Lagos and brings the plot full circle. Americanah is at its dullest when preoccupied with the yearning between these two, and Adichie relies too often on whole bricks of expository prose and almost mawkish character dynamics to drive her cast to romantic resolution.
The middle section of the novel seems imported from another project. Here, we have a livid, often frustrating, and relentlessly compelling examination of racism and prejudice, one that overturns the cheerier message of Afropolitan integration installed in Selasi’s essay and novel.
Ifemelu is the vehicle for much of these revelations. In America, she perceives an almost infinite multitude of tensions and subcategories. Whites – be they rich, poor, or ethnic – swing from the summit of the race ladder. The darkest of the blacks suffer and perish way down at the bottom. The black-skinned world is mottled with distinctions and fault lines, much of those caught up in an individual’s historical distance from Africa. Relationships are thickened by a mess of indicators: accents, education, music, diction, art, diet, first languages, religion, politics, class, fashion. It’s endless. Meanwhile, America works to neutralise the hallmarks of Ifemelu’s identity – her accent, her hair, her taste – allegedly because it can’t tolerate her pronounced Africana.
In England, Obinze experiences a similar racism, though slightly less supercharged; he’s black, and so treated as simply a lesser person. Relationships he had with family and friends in Nigeria are subverted in England, the class and power structures reversed by Obinze’s inability to legitimise his presence in the country by marrying one of its nationals. At the best of times, the majority is cold and indifferent. At the worst of times, it’s predatory. All the while, Africans dig in against other Africans.
Americanah pre-empts criticism against its most obvious faults. Readers bored with the overbearing romantic themes of its opening and closing acts are reminded by certain characters that their tastes have probably been corrupted by the preponderance of the modern American novel, with its supposedly vapid addiction to irony and aesthetic. Don’t care for the sometimes clumsy paragraphs linking the hearts of Ifemelu and Obinze? Then perhaps you’ve read too much David Foster Wallace.
Likewise, white readers who wonder if the Western world really is so ubiquitously racist, racial, and race-obsessed are told by Ifemelu that in fact they wouldn’t know. White people in America simply aren’t reminded of their race, because it’s never used against them. And if young white people remember the persecution of, say, their Irish or Italian grandparents, then they need to also remember that those ancestors had it much better than did the descendants of African slaves.
“You can’t write an honest novel about race in this country”, contends one character. “If you write about how people are really affected by race, it’ll be too obvious.”
Unfortunately, there are no redeeming white characters in the novel, and very few black ones who undergo Americanisation and come back uncorrupted. Adichie does illustrate a few whites who come close to decency, but ultimately their characters are lowered by the inherently clumsy or subtly entitled ways they relate to blacks.
On the face of things, that’s perfectly fine. Readers, and not authors, are at fault when they consume individual works of art in search of real-life representations. Characters are imagined to drive story, not appease politics – and anyway fiction isn’t journalism. Adichie’s reductionist characterisations tilt parts of her story into satire, and they’re often done with compelling strokes of humour and absurdity – except that Adichie herself looms over those reductions.
Through lectures, essays and themes in her fiction, she’s politicised herself, and by extension her work. Along with authors such as Binyavanga Wainaina – who, because of his caretaking of Americanah’s early drafts, she thanks in her acknowledgements – Adichie has emerged as something of a narrative nationalist. Her career is increasingly bound up with ideas of ideologically accurate and holistic representations of Africa and Africans. It therefore smacks a little bit of hypocrisy to read constantly of white Westerners who are, without much variation, venal, perverted, arrogant, intolerant, self-obsessed, or ridden with white-liberal-middle-class guilt complexes.
Numerous times in Americanah, Ifemelu contends that racism doesn’t exist in Nigeria. This is a bit hard to swallow. Racism, at its heart, is discrimination based on difference – real or perceived – and there’s more than enough of that in Nigeria or anywhere else people exist in even moderate diversity. Adichie circumvents Ifemelu’s idealism with the occasional nod to ethnic tensions in Nigeria, in particular a conversation between two characters that interprets the Biafran War. The point may be that in Nigeria, Ifemelu wouldn’t notice racism as she’s majority-coloured.
Either way, for America’s racist conceits, Infemelu prescribes the cure of love, writing in her blog that it’s the only force strong enough to subdue the ubiquity of racial prejudice. But she herself cannot find love with Americans, white or black, and ultimately finds her heart’s requital with Obinze. Both are Nigerian and both are Igbo.
At the end of Ghana Must Go, Selasi riffs on a similar theme, but wraps it up with more auspicious results. One of her main characters – a black African living in America – is able to overcome romantic strife and emotionally double-down with his partner, an Asian woman also living in America. It’s an optimistic pronouncement on the future of Afropolitinism because it imagines a continued and farther reaching arch of multi-racial harmony. Imagine now Afropolitans reconnecting and becoming little more than a subtle distinction of cosmopolitans. Tensions over difference melt away as people are increasingly indistinguishable according to race and origin.
But Adichie – named specifically in Selasi’s essay as an Afropolitan writer – closes her novel with considerably more cynicism. The Afropolitian experiment is over, her characters seem to say, and now it’s time to go back home.
Think Africa Press welcomes inquiries regarding the republication of its articles. If you would like to republish this or any other article for re-print, syndication or educational purposes, please contact: editor@thinkafricapress.com
For further reading around the subject see:
| Review – Ghana Must Go | Speaking About Africa: The Danger of a Single Story | Review – There Was a Country by Chinua Achebe |
Tabitha works as a consultant in the Policy Advocacy Unity of Sonke Gender Justice Network.